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PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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Final Report

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by

Samuel J. Newland

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NOTICES

Research on this report was completed in April 1988.

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The contents of this report represent the research and reasoning of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documents.

COMMENTS

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.

FOREWORD

This individual study, initiated by the Strategic Studies Institute, reviews emerging trends relating to defense in the postwar Federal Republic of Germany. It was undertaken because of the key role Germany plays, both by location and military forces, in the U.S. defensive posture in Europe.

The author, Major Samuel J. Newland, recognizes some of the apparent ongoing political and attitudinal changes in Germany. In spite of the assertiveness by some German politicians and the rise of the Greens (and strong SPD Left) he concludes that generally U.S.-German relations remain good. He cautions, however, that U.S. leadership should be aware of the growing trend for European assertiveness in foreign and military affairs and the "defense weariness" evident in postwar Germany. The study concludes with three factually based scenarios of Germany in 2013, allowing the reader to speculate about how the German political scene could affect the United States and its defense posture in 25 years.

The author appreciates the assistance provided by Colonel Henry Gole, Director, International and West European Studies; Colonel David Jablonsky, Director, Military Strategy; and Colonel William Mendel, Director, Military Strategy Studies, of the U.S. Army War College; LTC Douglas Johnson, Strategic Research Analyst, and COL Wolf Kutter, Chief of Staff, Army, Strategic Fellow, of the Strategic Studies Institute; and Ms. Melissa Houghton, a student of NATO and West European Affairs at Dickinson College. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the field of national security research and study.



KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, IN
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAJOR SAMUEL J. NEWLAND is a Strategic Research Analyst serving at the Strategic Studies Institute. He is a member of the Kansas Army National Guard (KSARNG) and is currently on a tour of active duty. He received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas with emphasis in German history since 1870. Prior to his present assignment he was Director of Community Colleges for the State of Kansas, had held staff positions with the 69th Infantry Brigade (M), and was Commander of the 102d Military History Detachment, KSARNG. He is the author of numerous articles and monographs on National Guard history and German political and military history since 1933.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This individual study examines the changing political spectrum in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a subject chosen because of the importance of the FRG to the U.S. defense effort and its key position in NATO. The report provides a brief survey of some issues from the past which impact on current German attitudes, a review of the issues which appear to be affecting the relationship between Germany and the United States, and scenarios which foresee three different Germanies in the world of 2013.

Some fissures have been developing between the United States and its strong ally of some 40 years. However, the author of this report concludes that there is no immediate danger of a rupture in the close relationship. Rather, an emerging trend for the Germans is to want more independence from the United States in terms of foreign relations and defense policies. This trend results from a number of factors, most importantly, a demographic one. The generation which experienced World War II and the postwar reconstruction is rapidly aging and the new generation does not view the United States or world politics like its predecessor. For example, current Germany no longer believes in a dominant threat of a Soviet war of aggression against Central Europe nor does it remember the United States as the country that founded the Marshall Plan. Instead, its memories are of Vietnam and Watergate. This does not mean that the Germans are anti-U.S., but simply shows their political attitudes and beliefs are changing and evolving.

The study encourages readers to recognize these changes and to illustrate their possible effects, the author constructs three different Germanies which could emerge by 2013, each based on the existent trends. To preserve the strong relationship between West Germany and the United States, it is necessary to not only understand that changes are occurring but to plan to manage changes in the future.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Section I. Introduction.

For many Americans concerned with national defense issues, the political trends in Europe are at best disturbing. Though the United States has led in the defense of Europe since the late 1940s, currently there seems to be a distinct lack of European confidence in both U.S. foreign policy leadership and the stability of the American commitment to Europe. This emerging European attitude has resulted from a series of foreign and defense policy fluctuations beginning in the Carter years and has culminated with the uneasiness of U.S. allies following Reykjavik and the recent arms reduction talks. In European eyes the recent negotiations and renewed discussions on Capitol Hill concerning U.S. troop reductions in Europe¹ seem to indicate that the U.S. commitment to Europe is wavering. Due to this uncertainty, the NATO Allies have initiated a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings on defense to which U.S. representatives have not been invited. France and Germany have begun bilateral discussions on closer military cooperation that have resulted in the creation of a Franco-German brigade, outside NATO. There is even talk of renewing and strengthening the West European Union (WEU), which has been largely inactive since 1957 and the creation of a European Army with its own nuclear capability.² In short, the NATO Allies seem very uneasy about some elements of American diplomacy and, as a result, a new assertiveness in foreign affairs is emerging in Europe.

These changing perceptions of U.S. leadership and the evolution of postwar European politics are most evident in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Since Germany is the keystone to the Atlantic alliance, both geographically and militarily, its gradual but consistent move toward more independent positions on foreign policy and defense issues raises a number of questions. Is one of the key European allies drifting toward neutralism, the Soviet bloc, or developing her own political priorities? Or is a new European-based security arrangement evolving? If a new political order is emerging, will it reduce or exclude the U.S. role in Europe, which has been so prominent since 1945?

The purpose of this study is to address such questions. First, a brief review of some issues that have shaped modern Germany is presented. Following this, the current situation in the FRG is analyzed, focusing on the apparent tendency of Germany to assert more independence in defense policy and move away from its close relationship with the United States. Political issues--including certain aspects of German politics since the war--are considered, and existing and new political trends are identified. Finally, issues and policies which seem to separate the United States and the Federal Republic are examined. Once the issues and trends have been reviewed, the writer develops three possible scenarios for Germany some 20 years in the future. These scenarios concern political-military matters more than domestic issues. The scope of this study is limited to the trends developing only in the FRG because of its importance as a key European ally.

Section II. The Cause for Concern.

A number of trends give U.S. policymakers cause to worry about Germany's future. For example, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the party of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, appears to have taken a distinct left turn. Rather than the pragmatic policies of the past, SPD leader Johannes Rau (who led the SPD in the 1987 elections) called for a "Nuclear Free Corridor in Central Europe," and promised to cut the Federal Republic's defense budget and cancel participation by Germany in the U.S.-sponsored Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars."³ Since the SPD demise in those elections, Rau's successor, Oskar La Fontaine, has led the party even further left, calling for a German withdrawal from the NATO military infrastructure.⁴ More ominous are the efforts by elements in the SPD to negotiate directly with the East German Communist Party (SED) and develop agreements on a variety of defense issues.⁵

Even if the drift of the SPD and the emergence of the conglomeration of environmentalists, leftists, and assorted antinuclear/antimilitarists called the Greens are discounted, positions taken in recent months by the German Government provide additional concern. The current conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) government, regarded as a staunch American ally, has (when possible) politely proceeded down its own diplomatic path vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For example, even as the Reagan Administration fumed about the Soviet Union's "Evil Empire," Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced Germany's willingness to assist the Soviet Union in its quest to modernize its economy. Or when the United States requested West German support in imposing additional sanctions against Libya in September 1986, the Germans declined.⁶ More recently, when the United States (after announcing it was escorting Kuwaiti ships through the Persian Gulf) requested West German naval support, the Germans again initially refused.⁷ Perhaps most significant, the Germans (as well as other NATO Allies) have been quite blunt about their dissatisfaction with President Reagan's attempted superpower deal (without allied consultation) at Reykjavik and the emerging plan to leave the defense of Europe to conventional means rather than nuclear.⁸ Continued U.S. pressure to upgrade short-range nuclear weapons, in the wake of the INF agreement may even exacerbate U.S./German differences vis-a-vis defense strategies.

In essence, elements of both the right and left in the German political spectrum seem dissatisfied with U.S. leadership. The right of center element led by the CDU/CSU combine appears uneasy because it played some important political cards to gain German acceptance for Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and SDI but is now concerned about the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe possibly dissolving in the rush for arms control agreements. Thus the right questions whether the United States can be trusted to provide leadership in the defense of Europe. The left of center elements, including the SPD and the Greens, have objected to the perceived acceleration of the arms race (particularly in the period 1980-86) and the presence of nuclear and chemical weapons on German soil. Furthermore, until the recent U.S./Soviet negotiations, even the moderate left decried the abandonment of detente (during most of the Reagan years) and the accompanying deemphasis on commercial and cultural contacts with the East.

Uniquely, the United States is faced with a strange coalition of opposition, both right and left, to its foreign and defense policies, and an erosion of the defense consensus in Germany's two main political parties.

The questions remain whether the apparent lack of German support for U.S. initiatives and the changing complexion of German partisan politics are merely temporary or if real changes are occurring in German politics. To understand the issues adequately, some background factors which were important in forming contemporary German attitudes should be examined to give the reader an understanding of those experiences which have shaped modern Germany.

Section III. Background Factors.

Political Insecurity. To properly consider political realities in contemporary Germany, the reader should recognize several important factors. First, in many respects the Germans are prisoners of their own geography. Situated either on the eastern fringe of Western Europe, the western fringe of Eastern Europe or, as some like to state, in a unique and distinct area called Central Europe,⁹ the Germans have always been concerned with defense against powerful neighboring states. This geographical insecurity, plus the fact that Germany as a political entity is a relatively new nation (1871), has caused some notable aberrations in her politics. Most significant was the strong militarism (first Prussia, then after 1871, Germany) and the excessive nationalism which culminated in the National Socialist regime of 1933-45. Both the exorbitant nationalism and the pomp and arrogance of German militarism were apparently destroyed in 1945 by a defeat so complete that there was no way it could be rationalized as had the defeat of 1918.¹⁰ Thus the postwar German leadership had to develop some type of new order rather than depending on the national values of 1871-1945.

The defeat also enabled the Germans to proceed with a task long overdue, the development of a strong democracy in a country requiring a powerful military force. Since 1955 they have done this admirably with heavy U.S. assistance and under the defense umbrella of NATO and U.S. deterrence. Although excessive nationalism and rampant militarism are no longer present in Germany, the feeling of insecurity and perceived need for a strong defense still persists, since Germany is the postwar focal point for conflict between the two superpowers. Thus defense (or military affairs) remains important to the FRG.

Economic Insecurity. Events in the 20th century have exacerbated German political insecurity and added a strong need for economic security. Three times in the 20th century the structure of the nation has been shattered by catastrophic events which destroyed the economic security of Germany's middle class. In the early 1920s this occurred through the ruinous runaway inflation which required a total restructuring of Germany's monetary system. The 1920s ended with the depression which, for the second time in a decade, destroyed the economic structure of the nation. Finally, when National Socialist Germany collapsed in 1945, the entire economic and manufacturing system of the nation was totally destroyed.

Three major economic disasters in two and one-half decades impressed the Germans with the need for economic security and for careful planning for long-term financial growth and security. Their postwar economic policies clearly indicate the importance they attach to this issue.

The Difficult Past. Another factor which haunts the Germans and is seldom forgotten, at least by the French, Russians, Poles, and Jews, is the unbewältigte vergangenheit, the undigested past. This unique phrase refers to the problem of adequately integrating the National Socialist period into the German experience. It is difficult to explain rationally that the Nazi regime systematically disposed of some six million Jews, millions of Slavs, and 300 thousand of its own people. Granted, the Germans are not unique in their anti-Semitic past. The Russians were well known for their pogroms in the last century as were the French for their anti-Semitism, a la the Dreyfus Affair. What is unique with the Germans is the businesslike efficiency with which the Nazi regime attempted to make Europe Judenfrei with near success.

From another perspective it is also difficult for many to forgive the Germans for embarking on a war of empire-building and revanche (1939) that plunged all of Europe into a war costing the Soviet Union alone 20 million casualties and Germany some 9 million.¹¹ This undigested past is not only a problem for Germans who try to teach new generations of their history, but it causes negative reactions by some of Germany's neighbors anytime proposals are developed for a stronger German Army, a Germany outside the Atlantic alliance, or a unified German nation. The question emerges, can the world trust a unified German nation of 80 million people? After 1933-45, many are still unwilling to take the risk.

For the Germans, this difficult past has produced an unique phenomenon, a loss or sublimation of German national identity. The war shattered German unity, and in many respects discredited German nationalism, producing a country that lacks a sense of direction and many of the trappings of a sovereign nation. For example, Germany is dependent on NATO for her security, cannot possess nuclear weapons, finds her traditional capital still garrisoned by foreign troops and much of her nation an armed camp. In Germany the perception, right or wrong, has endured that Bonn cannot proceed too far in foreign policy without Washington's blessing. On the state and local level, enclaves of extraterritoriality exist where U.S., British and French laws prevail, rather than those of Germany. This legacy of a defeated nation has produced a sense of weakness among the populace and a lack of self confidence that is disturbing. The absence of true national sovereignty coupled with the war guilt/war crimes legacy of Nazism have partially neutered the German nation's pride and suppressed patriotism. Recent surveys have shown that West Germans consistently rank at the bottom of the scale on national pride.¹² True, the Germans are extremely proud of the economic strength and power they have amassed since 1945, but national identity has suffered greatly from the National Socialist era. These factors undermine the interests of the Federal Republic and its NATO Allies as they address difficult political-military issues of defending Europe.¹³

The Dream of Reunification. This discussion logically leads to yet another relic from the past, the issue of German reunification. Like Korea, a unified Germany became a casualty of World War II and the Cold War which subsequently followed. In the case of Germany the division was far worse than Korea since it was accompanied by substantial territorial losses. With allied victory imminent, the Soviet Union seized part of East Prussia. Poland was given the remainder of Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia ("Stuffing the Polish goose with German feed," as Churchill later stated).¹⁴ Germany east of the Elbe (or what was left of it) was assigned to Soviet occupation and Berlin, the nation's capital, was placed under four power occupation. Though claims to the lost German territory east of the Oder-Neisse River¹⁵ are now a moot point, the unification of the old east and west occupational zones is not. Since the beginning of the Federal Republic in 1949, the reunification of East and West Germany has been an important issue that is never far below the surface. Granted, the younger generation may not approach it with the fervor of their elders, but even the hint of reunification still brings stirrings of hope among Germans and anxiety among Germany's neighbors. This can best be seen by the effect of recent hints that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev might offer the possibility of German reunification even as Stalin did in 1952.¹⁶ The possibility of such a proposal, which has thus far not been extended, caused a wave of "What if . . ." discussions that has not subsided. According to a Emnid Poll in 1987, some 81 percent of the West German populace wanted reunification, as compared to only 66 percent in 1985,¹⁷ indicating that reunification continues to be of great interest.

The Paradoxical German Attitude toward the Soviet Union. A discussion of German reunification leads to yet another factor. Any possibility of German reunification could only occur with the cooperation or permission of the Soviet Union, and cooperation between the Soviets and Germans would not be without precedent. The Germans, however, display a schizophrenic attitude toward the Soviet Union. Even though they have maintained political and commercial contacts with the East for generations, the 20th century has seen a contradictory trend which can best be described as a fear of communism in general but a fear of the Soviets in particular.

Due to geographic location, it has been advantageous culturally, philosophically, and economically for the Germans to maintain good relations with the Soviets. As a source of raw materials and as a market for German technology or manufactured goods, the USSR has been a logical trade partner. From another perspective, cultural and family ties have existed between the Germans and the Russians, the people of the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania for the last several centuries.¹⁸ Even in Hitler's Germany, sizeable factions in the Army, government, and political apparatus were fascinated by the Slavs and sought to cooperate with Soviet citizens and liberate them from the oppressive yoke of Bolshevism.¹⁹

Viewed politically, trends for cooperation with the Soviets can easily be found in the recent past. For example, as the new German empire began in 1870, Germany allied herself with Russia in the League of the Three Emperors

(in 1873). In addition to renewing the same alliance (in 1881 and again in 1884), the Germans strengthened the tie with another alliance known as the Reinsurance Treaty (1887). Though this alliance system developed under Bismarck's tutelage, it was allowed to lapse in 1890.²⁰ After World War I, Germany and the new Soviet government again initiated cooperative military ventures (through provisions of the Treaty of Rapallo, 1922) which would last into the early 1930s. Despite their anti-Russian rhetoric, even the National Socialists, in an opportunistic and Machiavellian mood, signed the 1939 Nonaggression Pact with the Soviets, together determining the fate of Poland and the Baltic States.

From the opposite perspective, ever since the specter of European communism first appeared in 1917, the Germans have worried about the Soviets and the ideology which they seemed insistent on exporting. For the Germans the dangers of Marxian socialism were quickly brought home in 1918 through revolts in various parts of Germany, many of which had Marxist inspiration.²¹ From the earliest period in the 1920s, National Socialism, with its strongly anti-Slav/anti-Marxist base, exacerbated the anti-Russian/anti-Communist feeling. The National Socialists bombarded Germany with anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda for some 15 years. In the last 4 years of this period Germany engaged in a life-or-death, winner-take-all war with the Soviets which gave new intensity to anti-Russian feelings. With the Soviet Army's victory in 1945 and the takeover of Eastern Europe after World War II, the worst fears of the Germans about the Soviets and communism were realized.²²

Since 1947 the cold war has strengthened German fears about world communism, the Soviets, and their designs on Western Europe. For 40 years the Germans have literally lived on the front line of the cold war as the staging area for a real war and the battleground for many covert wars. The Soviet Berlin blockade (1948), the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961), and the Soviet actions in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968) have only encouraged German fears of the Russians and communism.

If the Germans sometimes appear to be confused or unclear regarding their position on the Soviet Union, evidence indicates that they have good cause to view the Soviets, their policies, and their brand of Marxian Socialism with mixed emotions. It is difficult to predict, in the long term, whether the tradition of confrontation or accommodation will prevail.

Who Controls European Affairs? There is a feeling, which has ebbed and flowed since World War II, that European countries do not control their own affairs. By the late 1940s, the continent that produced Cardinal Richelieu, Catherine the Great, Louis XIV, Prince Metternich, and Bismarck was no longer charting its diplomatic course but following the lead of the United States, both in foreign affairs and national defense matters.

The French, through the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, first bristled at what they felt was U.S. dominance and pulled out of the NATO military infrastructure. In addition, they built and maintained their own nuclear arsenal and still jealously guard their independence in national defense and

international relations. Their position is not inherently anti-American, but may best be summed up by a recent quote from French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac who stated:

Europeans are looking for nobody's blessing, not even of a friend or of an ally; Europeans are of age and can establish their own policy.²³

The Germans have taken a mixed approach to the whole issue. Since the end of World War II, they have heavily depended on the United States to defend them from the Soviet Union, both with conventional and nuclear forces. Furthermore, they express great concern about any suggestions of troop withdrawals or the possibility of "decoupling" the United States from Europe.²⁴ On the other hand, they have resented U.S. dominance over European foreign affairs and believe that U.S. interests are often placed above German.

For example, during the INF negotiations in 1982, the U.S. Government rejected a compromise suggested by the Soviets without even discussing it with the Germans. According to then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, "I would still buy his formula at the drop of a hat, because it was a wise compromise."²⁵ In 1980, without consultation with its allies, the United States imposed a grain embargo followed in 1982 by a pipeline equipment embargo against the Soviet Union. On these two actions the Europeans simply refused to participate. Former Chancellor Schmidt remains the most eloquent German spokesman on the issue of U.S. dominance, charging that the Kohl government "rejects every difference of opinion with U.S. policies as damnable anti-Americanism."²⁶

The last decade, under the Carter and Reagan Administrations, has seen the continued growth of German resentment caused, at least in part, by U.S. failure to adequately consult with its allies or consider their interests in the decisionmaking process.

The Fear of Another War. At least subliminally in Germany a distinct fear of another war exists. This may seem so self-evident that the comment might appear superfluous. Most logical people fear war. In Germany, however, the feeling is so intense that it deserves special mention.

One should remember that only the Soviet Union suffered more than Germany from the ravages of World War II. In direct human costs, some nine million Germans lost their lives during World War II (five million were killed in action or died as POWs).²⁷ From the standpoint of material loss, in the period October 1939 to May 1945, the Air Forces of the Allied powers (primarily the RAF) dropped over one-half million tons of incendiaries, high explosives and fragmentation bombs in area raids on 61 selected German cities having a population of 100 thousand or more. These cities had a total population of 25 million people and through such raids lost 3,600,000 dwellings or roughly 20 percent of Germany's total residential units.²⁸ This immense material loss was exacerbated in the postwar years when the allies (both East and West) dismantled a number of

Germany's surviving factories and shipped these off to other nations as reparations. It is a lesson many Germans still remember. Indeed, at no time since the Thirty Years War (1618-48) were the sufferings and privations of war so clearly brought home to the Germans.²⁹

What the Germans also cannot forget is that in the event of another major war, which would involve the NATO countries, Germany would likely be the major battleground. Indeed, the mental picture emerges of opposing forces fighting pitched battles in places like Leipzig, Frankfurt, Hanover or Aachen. Obviously, the Germans do not want a replay of World War II. The memories are too vivid and too bitter.

Postwar Growth of Democratic Traditions. To adequately understand postwar Germany, an important factor must be highlighted. One of the significant accomplishments of the FRG is the development of a strong parliamentary democracy. This accomplishment, in a country where militarism and authoritarianism prevailed, even overshadows the well recognized accomplishment, the Wirtschaftswunder.³⁰

Prior to the post World War II era, it seemed that every attempt at developing a German parliamentary democracy failed. German revolutionaries tried to develop such a democracy in 1830 and 1848. Their attempts failed due to the armed resistance of strong Austrian and Prussian governments. Following 1848, a democratic tradition slowly developed in the German states (but at a snail's pace). In 1918 when the German monarchy failed, a Republic was proclaimed, only to be destroyed in 1933 by Hitler and his National Socialists. With the defeat of National Socialism in 1945 and under the watchful eyes of the Western Allied Powers, German democracy rapidly progressed.

The beginnings of West German democracy were first seen through the reemergence of political parties shortly after the end of World War II. Since the Federal Republic's inception Germany has been dominated by two major political parties. At the beginning of the postwar era the Social Democratic Party (SPD), utilizing prewar politicians who were well versed in parliamentary democracy, seemed to be the best organized and most forceful group.³¹ When the German elections were held (August 1949) however, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-Christian Social Union (CSU) under Konrad Adenauer won. In many respects the SPD's doctrinaire approach to opposition proved to be its downfall.

Due to this election the SPD was relegated to begin its participation in postwar democracy as an opposition party (even as it was in the prewar years)--a tradition which would continue until 1959. Then, after 10 years under the leadership of the party's left wing, a group of the party's reform elements took power and shed its doctrinaire Marxist approach. This new pragmatic leadership gained control of the party at the Bad Godesberg Congress and determined that it would build a strong mass appeal party which would provide continued economic growth and some social redistribution as called for within the Social Democratic tradition.³² This decision

propelled the SPD into its role as a successful national party and permitted it to exhibit its first class leadership with statesmen like Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. This reform group would dominate the SPD for over two decades and would not lose control of the party until 1983.

The CDU/CSU Party combine has been and remains the other major political party in postwar Germany. The Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, are descendants of the Catholic Center parties which were so important in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In the first postwar elections in 1949, the CDU/CSU came to power under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer and retained its leadership until 1963. The Germans under Adenauer were successful in building a strong democratic government and a prosperous and rapidly reconstructed Germany. Perhaps most encouraging, at no time during the postwar era has Germany succumbed to radicalism of the right or left.³³ For most of the postwar period only three parties have regularly polled more than the requisite 5 percent minimum which is necessary for representation in the Bundestag (the lower house). These three are the SPD, CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The latter has served in coalitions on numerous occasions and has impact beyond its 7-9 percent of the voters. It has never provided a serious challenge to the two major parties.³⁴

Section IV. Current Political Party Trends.

In the last decade trends have emerged which could threaten the stability of Germany's postwar political system. Key among these trends are the recent developments in the SPD. Sometime between 1979 and 1980 the SPD began to veer away from the pragmatic political group and its former consensus with the United States (and its CDU/CSU colleagues) on defense and security issues.³⁵ One contributing reason for this shift in positions was a decided change in the party's support base during the preceding 20 years. The SPD was originally a blue collar workers' party. By the mid-1970s only a little better than one-quarter of the party had blue collar affiliations, with the majority having a white collar orientation.³⁶ The new and younger white collar membership has been increasingly critical of the bastardization of the party's traditional positions at Bad Godesberg. Once the new leaders took control in early 1983, they rapidly altered the SPD's very pragmatic positions on defense to the point that by the 1987 elections the defense platform called for:

1. Reemphasis on East-West detente, and a departure from confrontational politics with the East bloc. Ideological confrontations should be replaced by an emphasis on peaceful consensus building.
2. A virtual abandonment of the old NATO security base, i.e., nuclear deterrence, and instead movement toward a denuclearized Europe. In addition, the SPD seeks the removal of chemical weapons from Europe.
3. Immediate cancellation of the U.S.-German SDI Accord.

4. A repudiation of any offensive warfare concepts in current military strategy to include a specific rejection of the "AirLand Battle Doctrine" and "Deep Strike" strategies proposed by the U.S. Army. Furthermore, the party calls for the German Army to be restructured so it can only wage defensive warfare.³⁷

5. Above all there is a strong trend in most of the SPD's factions to move toward a Europeanization of defense efforts and a tendency to encourage German self-assertion in matters of foreign and defense policy.³⁸

Granted, the old moderate pragmatic wing of the party formerly led by Helmut Schmidt continues to exist, but it currently lacks leadership and at present is eclipsed by the left of center factions. At this stage it seems unlikely that the SPD will return to a more moderate leadership or policies in the immediate future.

A second political trend is the emergence of the Greens. The Greens are the youngest national party in the FRG (1979-80). They do not promote a tightly knit political organization but are rather a diverse conglomerate of environmentalists, nuclear activists, antimilitarists and peace activists. The party promotes a higher degree of environmental awareness and seeks virtual unilateral disarmament and withdrawal from NATO.

Currently the party is split into two basic factions, the "fundis" and the "realos." The former, the fundamentalists, hope to keep the basic Green principles pure whereas the latter, as more pragmatic politicians, seek coalitions with like-minded SPD elements. The bitterness with which these two elements fight each other often causes observers to wonder whether they consider their greatest enemies to be inside or outside the Green Party. Nevertheless, their adamant antidefense plank calls for unilateral disarmament, and their desire for a Germany outside NATO and without nuclear armaments makes them a cause for concern. This is particularly so since in the January 1987 elections the Green Party captured 8.3 percent of the vote (giving it 42 seats in the Bundestag) and the Greens have become more vocal than ever, due to their substantial increase in strength.³⁹

The pillar of strength for U.S./NATO positions in Germany has been and remains the CDU/CSU. There seems to be no reason to believe that this will radically change in the immediate future. The CDU/CSU still values U.S. presence in Europe, retains more traditional ideas on defense issues and many within the party still regard the Soviets with great mistrust. Despite the unwillingness of the party's leadership to concur with the Reagan Administration's policies on Libya and past embargos or the party's concerns about current arms control initiatives, it has generally agreed with the thrust of U.S. defense policies in Europe. It has been so close to U.S. policies that former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt charged that under CDU/CSU leadership West German influence in Washington is so low that Bonn has been reduced to a client status.⁴⁰ If anything, the CDU currently suffers from an indecisiveness, due to Chancellor Kohl's tendency to procrastinate on difficult decisions or be a "fence sitter" until the problem either resolves itself or the answer becomes so obvious that it is self evident.⁴¹ Simply, the CDU/CSU is not suffering radical political changes like the SPD.

Section V. Changes in German Perceptions.

Within an alliance differences of opinion between sovereign states are certain to emerge. In order to place the issue in proper perspective, it is important to remember that through most of the postwar era there has been remarkable consensus between Germany and the United States on how best to defend Europe. For example, the postwar German governments under Adenauer, Ehrhardt, and Kiesinger (all CDU/CSU) were in agreement that it was in the Federal Republic's best interests to pursue strong ties with the West, the Western Alliance, and push the Soviets for full recognition of the Federal Republic as the legitimate German Government (thereby setting the stage for German reunification). This philosophy, bolstered by a strong anti-Communist pro-American viewpoint, formed the basis of Germany's defense efforts until October 1969, when a major shift in governmental policy began.

An SPD government, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, brought an entirely different perspective to the defense of Europe and East-West relations. Convinced that confrontational politics between East and West were accomplishing nothing, Brandt decided to take a new approach. With Germany firmly anchored in the Western alliance (and this was an extremely important base for his new initiative), Brandt began his famous Ostpolitik or as Egon Bahr, SPD strategist, better described it: Wandel durch Annäherung.⁴² Through Brandt's initiative, substantial progress was made in thawing relations between the Soviets and the West German Government, to include significant treaties which recognized the war's end.⁴³

His policies of improved relations with the East based on strong ties with the Western alliance were perfected through the able leadership of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt after 1974. Whereas Brandt seemed unable to totally escape the consequences of recognizing the de facto postwar boundaries of Germany and dealing with the Soviets and East Germans on a number of issues,⁴⁴ Schmidt from 1974 through 1983 emerged as a strong leader in his abilities to both handle German domestic politics and as a world political leader. Schmidt's policies rested on a strong tie to Western Europe, the Atlantic alliance, and sound defense ties with the United States. At the same time Schmidt sought to continue the process initiated by Brandt to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The distinctive element of his chancellorship was his insistence that Germany be treated as an equal partner in both defense and the political decisionmaking process. From his perspective the United States was all too often guilty of making decisions on foreign relations and the defense of Europe without consulting her European allies.⁴⁵ On this issue irritations have developed between the United States and Germany.

Section VI. The Origins of Some Divisive Issues.

Many of the issues which serve as major irritants between Germany and the United States began during the Carter Administration with the major thrust for arms reduction through the existing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). From the German perspective the Carter approach to SALT was a rather one-sided affair. It seemed to focus on arms reductions without an

accompanying move to improve East-West relations. The Schmidt government was firmly committed to a continuance and furtherance of Ostpolitik while President Carter was at best lukewarm toward the Soviets--perceiving them as villains, due to Soviet human rights violations.⁴⁶

Adding to this basic philosophical difference, a major disagreement emerged in 1978 over President Carter's handling of the neutron bomb issue. The neutron bomb was opposed at the onset by many Germans because the warhead was designed for delivery systems with a range of less than 100 miles. To adopt this system meant two things to the Germans:

1. With a limited range it would likely be used in East or West Germany in the event of war.

2. Since it was a tidier weapon system that could be used with greater discrimination, it would permit U.S. escalation to the nuclear level in battlefield zones without threatening either the Soviet or U.S. homeland. The victims would be German.

Despite German reservations, pressure was applied to the chancellor and his ruling party to support the deployment of the neutron bomb in Germany. After Schmidt had grudgingly agreed to accept this weapon, Carter suddenly and unilaterally decided to drop his plans to produce the neutron warhead. The embarrassment to Schmidt and his government was immense because they were simply and unceremoniously left holding the bag--advocating a weapons system that they never wanted. In particular, it is important to note that a sizeable element of Schmidt's SPD opposed his neutron bomb decision and Schmidt sided with the American president, only to be left standing alone.⁴⁷

The neutron bomb issue was almost immediately followed by another U.S.-German controversy which centered on defense priorities. In 1979, with no arms control agreement in sight and increasing concern about Soviet SS-20 deployments, the United States (with NATO concurrence) decided to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles (intermediate-range nuclear forces or INF). Even though Chancellor Schmidt first raised the concern about SS-20s and proposed PII/GLCM deployments, opposition to this plan was quick to form in Schmidt's own party. The Chancellor defended the deployment as a logical decision, due to the lack of progress on arms control.⁴⁸ That many in the SPD failed to agree was obvious at the December 1979 party congress and this sentiment continued to grow until Schmidt's government fell in September 1982. By the end of the year the SPD had repudiated Schmidt's policies and began developing an entirely new security policy emphasizing that security can only be assured through dialogue with an enemy, not by polarizing against him. Thus, European peace could only come through a continuance of detente, arms control, and building confidence between the two opposing camps.⁴⁹

The fall of the Schmidt government and the return of a CDU/CSU-led government headed by Helmut Kohl provided no breather for the United States or NATO on the INF issue. Even though the CDU/CSU government strongly supported INF deployment and later the highly controversial (in Germany)

German participation in SDI research,⁵⁰ resistance to many elements of the U.S. defense posture has continued to grow. Concerns over U.S. positions have reached their present height as a result of two issues: U.S. diplomacy (or lack thereof) at Reykjavik and the continual desire of U.S. leadership for upgrading shorter range nuclear missiles. At Reykjavik, Soviet proposals were presented to the United States which (according to European perceptions) if accepted, would have removed the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the European continent. Despite the implications of such a move for the NATO Alliance, only President Reagan's stubborn insistence on SDI prevented a favorable response on Secretary Gorbachev's proposals. Europeans (to include the Germans) were aghast that their security was almost bargained away without their knowledge or consultation.⁵¹

To further complicate German-American relations, in the wake of the INF treaty the United States is now pushing for a modernization of short-range nuclear weapons, to include a follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile system, modernization of NATO's nuclear artillery, and dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs. These proposals are again being poorly received by the Germans, including the current CDU government. In some way reminiscent of the neutron bomb issue, the Germans see the shorter-range intermediate missiles (SRINF) as insuring that, in the event of war, East and West Germany and their populations will be the major casualties of the war. Despite German resistance, the United States (and Great Britain and France) continue to press for modernization of short-range nuclear weapons.⁵²

To date the Kohl government has firmly supported close German/U.S. relations and values a strong military presence in Europe for its traditional deterrence role. Conversely, trends in West German political parties (particularly the SPD) and a number of recent disagreements between the United States and Germany on defense issues indicate some basic differences. Perhaps the greatest problem facing the United States and its policies in Germany is the changing attitude of the German populace on defense issues.

Section VII. Current German Attitudes on Defense and East-West Relations.

While acknowledging that the opinion of the populace of any given country is at best changing, if not fickle, some trends in Germany should be carefully examined. If the United States has a reason to be concerned about any specific attitudes in Germany, it is the disparity in U.S. and German opinion about the potential for war and more specifically the level of threat posed by the Soviet Union. As early as December 1985 (according to a USIA poll), a sizeable percentage of those polled in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands indicated little concern about the possibility of an attack on West Europe. (See Table 1). Furthermore, since they saw little danger in a Soviet attack, there was little sentiment for increased defense expenditures in these countries.

	<u>UK</u>	<u>FR</u>	<u>GE</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>NE</u>
<u>I. Possibility of a Soviet Attack on West Europe in Next 5 Years.</u>					
Very or Fairly Concerned	28	29	16	7	12
Not very or not at all concerned	60	57	71	83	82
<u>II. Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Military Strength</u>					
U.S. Ahead	22	21	17	21	23
Equal	38	39	47	52	48
USSR Ahead	28	19	20	18	18
<u>III. Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy</u>					
Great Deal or Fair Amount	41	42	41	56	39
Not Much or None	53	38	46	41	54
<u>IV. Adequacy of (Survey Country's) Defense Spending</u>					
Should be Increased	13	12	7	14	8
Should be Decreased	28	16	36	46	35
Should Remain the Same	56	41	42	33	49

Table 1. West European Political Attitudes
on International Security Topics (USIA Poll 12/85).⁵³

Similar conclusions were reached in a December 1986 Gallup poll. According to this poll a significant number of Americans continued to believe that the outbreak of a world war was a distinct possibility. Germans and West Europeans however were less apprehensive, as indicated in Table 2.

50% Chance of War or Greater

United States	49 percent
Belgium	24
France	24
Italy	22
Spain	22
Norway	21
Austria	20
Great Britain	20
Denmark	18
Switzerland	18
W. Germany	18
Sweden	15
Netherlands	14

Table 2. Chance of World War in 10 Years.⁵⁴

What has been most surprising to many American observers are the attitudes expressed by the citizens of Germany on the leadership of the two major world powers. As an example, in the 1980s the Germans have increasingly lost confidence in the traditional image of the United States as a peacemaker or a peaceful nation. Conversely, they are beginning to regard the Soviet Union as a nation that desires peace rather than as a threat to world peace.

The marked change in German attitude appears to have come between 1980-81 (see Table 3) when the controversy over missile deployments was developing into a major issue and coincided with the beginning of the Reagan Administration. German confidence in the Soviet Union and in Soviet leadership has continued to build with the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Who is responsible for the arms race between East and West?

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>Neither</u>
1981	8	36	42	4
1982	12	30	40	6
1983	9	23	50	3
1986	12	22	47	8

Who most threatens world peace?

1980	2	71	14	8
1981	4	44	28	12
1982	4	35	22	23
1983	2	32	34	18
1986	5	26	30	27

Who wants peace in the world?

1980	52	3	29	7
1981	33	4	31	14
1982	25	3	45	16
1983	20	2	57	14
1986	22	3	56	12

Table 3. German Perceptions of the Two Superpowers.⁵⁵

In Germany, polls clearly indicate a substantial trust in Gorbachev and his initiatives. According to a poll released by the German Allendbach Institute in May 1987, only 46 percent of the Germans believed that President Reagan is really concerned about peace whereas 49 percent were convinced that Mr. Gorbachev is.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the Allendbach poll indicated that, in the future, 58 percent of the German citizenry wanted Bonn to cooperate equally with the United States and Russia while only 32 percent wanted to work closely only with the United States.⁵⁷

	General Populace	CDU Members	SPD Members	FPD Members	Greens Members	18-29 Age Gp	30-44 Age Gp	45-59 Age Gp	Over 60
WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE INITIATIVES BY GORBACHEV TO REMOVE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN MISSILES FROM EUROPE?	Very Good Good Not as Good Strengthen Communism Don't Know	54 38 4 1 3	46 45 5 2 2	64 30 3 1 2	59 37 4 0 0	67 31 1 0 1	56 38 4 0 1	56 35 5 1 3	56 38 3 1 2
IS THE DANGER OF A WAR BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TODAY ACTUALLY . . .	Greater Smaller About the Same Don't Know	9 42 41 8	6 53 36 5	10 43 43 4	4 46 46 4	16 25 54 5	10 42 45 3	6 53 35 6	7 44 39 10
WHO IN YOUR OPINION IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT SECURING PEACE AND DISARMAMENT?	Reagan Gorbachev About Same Don't Know	9 49 30 12	13 39 38 10	8 65 22 5	7 48 30 15	3 72 15 10	8 54 26 12	11 46 36 7	10 41 35 14
IN YOUR OPINION ARE GORBACHEV'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS REALLY SINCERE OR NOT?	Yes No Don't Know	69 10 21	67 12 21	80 8 12	80 6 14	82 2 16	74 9 17	70 6 24	68 10 22
IN YOUR OPINION WILL GORBACHEV REALLY CHANGE OR ARE HIS REFORMS SIMPLY FOR THE OUTSIDE WORLD?	Will Change Propaganda Don't Know	74 12 14	75 12 13	80 11 9	94 2 4	85 5 10	81 10 9	77 11 12	70 10 20
DOES GORBACHEV WANT TO GO IN THE DIRECTION OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY OR TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNISM?	Western Democracy Strengthen Comm Don't Know	21 63 16	22 66 12	22 66 12	26 72 2	16 65 19	20 70 10	20 62 18	26 48 26
WILL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES IMPROVE THROUGH GORBACHEV REFORMS?	Improve No Influence Don't Know	60 30 10	64 29 7	62 30 8	74 26 0	56 39 5	60 35 5	67 22 11	65 20 15

Table 4. Forsa Institute German Opinion Poll, Commissioned by Stern Magazine.

In addition to the Allenbach poll (commissioned by the Kohl government), the German magazine Stern funded an opinion poll through the Dortmund based Forsa Institute. According to the results, 49 percent of the sample found Secretary Gorbachev more concerned with achieving disarmament and peace while only 9 percent named President Reagan. (See Table 4.)⁵⁸ This trend (at least from an U.S. perspective) has continued to worsen. A mid-September 1987 poll by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen indicated that 76 percent of the Germans polled believed they could trust Gorbachev. In May 1987, a similar survey showed 52 percent, a 24 percentage point change in four months. In addition the same poll indicated that 74 percent of the German population regarded German-Soviet relations as good. In November 1986, 45 percent held this opinion.⁵⁹

The results indicated by Tables 1-4 should not be misinterpreted. None of the polls cited represent a radical shift to an anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet stance by the German people. They do indicate, however, three significant factors: that many Germans are not convinced that there is a serious threat of a major war in Europe (instigated by the Soviets or anyone else); that serious doubts exist about U.S. foreign policy leadership and U.S. political leadership in general;⁶⁰ and that the Gorbachev initiatives are being optimistically received by many Germans as a genuine and believable peace initiative.

According to available and credible poll results, German support for NATO has not wavered and the vast majority of German citizens still regard the presence of American troops as being important for their national security (see Tables 5 and 6). Furthermore, no evidence suggests any groundswell of anti-Americanism in the FRG.

<u>German Opinions</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
FRG should remain in NATO	88%	90%	87%
U.S. troops in FRG make peace more secure	79%	80%	78%
U.S. troops in FRG are indispensable	75%	73%	76%
Oppose U.S. troops withdrawal	73%	73%	76%
Communist threat is great/very great	45%	47%	37%

Table 5. Summary of Emnid Institute Public Opinion Survey Results.⁶¹

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u>	<u>FDP</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>GREENS</u>
Greet a withdrawal	22	11	13	26	63
Regret a withdrawal	51	68	61	42	17
Don't know	27	21	26	32	20

Table 6. Poll on German Reaction to Withdrawal of U.S. Troops (by political party).⁶²

Section VIII. Impact on German/U.S. Relations.

If pollsters, American and German, are accurate, a major rupture in German-U.S. relations is not imminent. What is obvious, however, is that many Germans no longer believe that a war in Europe is going to occur nor do they believe that the Soviets are a menace to European peace. Their attitudes toward the Soviets in general have changed but the most noticeable change has been in their perceptions of the Soviet leadership. They now regard General Secretary Gorbachev as being more concerned with peace than President Reagan and believe that better relations between the two Germanies and the FRG and the Soviet Union is a trend for the future. Though the majority still value membership in NATO and the presence of American troops,⁶³ the German sense of urgency about war or a Soviet threat is not present. An equally troublesome problem is the steady erosion of a defense consensus in Germany among the leading political parties. If the attitudes of the SPD and CDU/CSU parties are compared on Tables 4 and 6, or if all of the major parties depicted on the tables are compared, it becomes obvious that the political parties in Germany have diverging opinions on defense, the Soviet Union and the need for U.S. presence.

If these trends persist, and without a major blunder on the part of the Soviets they probably will, the United States will need to consider them as it interfaces with the FRG. U.S. policymakers can no longer assume that their German ally is in agreement on defense oriented initiatives. This fact, will necessitate far more diplomacy in dealing with the Germans and a better understanding of the German approach to Europe and its defense. In fact, U.S. political and military leaders will need to carefully watch the emerging trends in Germany if the close relationships of the past are to be maintained into the future. To do so a number of significant trends should be identified.

Section IX. Trends to be Monitored.

A complete list of the trends which impact on modern Germany would extend this paper beyond its design, but the most significant factors are examined. These are: the changing attitude of Germany's political parties on defense issues; German weariness of being a staging ground for World War III; the differing perspectives of German leaders (as compared to their U.S. colleagues) on East-West relations; a renewal of German insecurities; the increasing tendency for Europeans to desire a leading role in the defense of Europe; and a decreasing willingness for Germany to do penance for its Nazi past.

Changes in Germany's Political Parties. One of the key areas in Germany which should be closely monitored in the next decade is the developing trends in the political parties. The CDU/CSU shows little change in its support base or its philosophical underpinning nor does the FDP. The parties to watch are the SPD and the Greens.

At present there are no firm indications as to whether the left of center factions within the SPD will continue to dominate or whether a more

practical, a more pragmatic faction again will take control. The SPD has changed its doctrinal focus twice since the end of the war and another change is possible in the foreseeable future. The political "drift" of the SPD and its success nationally at the polls is very important for the U.S. defense posture in Europe. If the SPD with its current defense and foreign relations platform is successful at the polls, serious difficulties could arise for the United States.

Even more serious, successes by the Greens or major coalitions between the "realo" elements and the SPD could also have serious impacts on U.S. policies in Europe. In perspective, the Greens remain a rather disjointed political group that has yet to produce a major threat to U.S. efforts in Europe. In many respects, what is more disturbing than the emergence of this new party are the developing German attitudes mirrored in the ideologies represented by the Greens and the left of center SPD. Both parties represent an attitudinal change on the part of the German voters. These voters are less concerned about defense against the Soviets and are more interested in peace and a high quality life. If antidefense attitudes continue to mature in Germany, serious problems could result for the United States and the NATO Alliance.

Defense Weariness. Closely related to this, since 1947 Germany has served as the focal point for the cold war and as the staging and potential battleground for a possible confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. U.S., British, and French troops have been stationed in Germany to deter war or, if this fails, defeat the aggressor forces (probably on German soil). Though war has not come the fact remains that the Germans have, so to speak, been on the front lines of a planned battlefield for 40 years. Any number of studies have indicated that even a trained professional soldier can only adequately function in a frontline position for so many days without losing some efficiency.⁶⁴ Indications are that, like soldiers too long at the front, the Germans are suffering from fatigue. They call it Verteidigungsmudigkeit or defense weariness. They are becoming increasingly tired of hosting preparations for a war and would prefer to live in a country that is prepared for war but not always preparing for a war. This "weariness" is further heightened by the realization that with a new emphasis on conventional arms (rather than nuclear) and short range missiles, the future battlefield would most certainly be Germany, East or West.⁶⁵ This of course renews to the Germans the specter of World War II with all of its devastation, compounded by the probable use of at least chemical if not nuclear weapons. These factors, together with the presence of 900 thousand troops, in a country the size of Oregon, is wearing on the nation's nerves.

The presence of so many troops in Germany again becomes a major issue when Europe in general and Germany in particular remain unconvinced about the imminence of war (Table 2). As West German author Peter Bender notes, "NATO was founded, moreover, amid widespread fear that the cold war would turn hot. No one today believes that Moscow will launch a military attack."⁶⁶ [Emphasis has been added.]

Increasingly Different Perspectives on East-West Relations. A good portion of the difference between German and U.S. views on this topic can be

attributed to two factors: First, the Soviet threat has dimmed considerably in German eyes. The most recent brash and reckless use of Soviet military or political power was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The 20 years that have passed since that crisis have removed the urgency of the Soviet threat and defense measures necessary to counter it. The Germans with their regional, European perspective do not share a global perspective with the United States and are not concerned with a worldwide Soviet threat. As they see little immediate danger to Europe, they see little threat at all. Secondly, German-U.S. perceptions decidedly differ on the necessity of improving relations between the West and the Soviets. The Gorbachev initiatives have served as a catalyst to highlight these differences which are all too often ignored.

The divergence of opinion actually began in the late 1970s. Detente and with it the advantages of better economic, political and cultural contacts with the East bloc have become increasingly accepted by Germans of all political persuasions. This is best illustrated by remembering that detente was born in the decade of Germany's first Socialist government, starting with the early years of Brandt's chancellorship. Although Germany has been governed for 5 years by a CDU/CSU conservative government, detente has continued unabated. Kohl, a bona fide conservative, has continued to press for better intra-German and better German-Soviet relations rather than the polarized politics of the earlier CDU governments.⁶⁷

One element which cannot be ignored is the relative position of Germany in the European economy. Germany serves as a major exporter of quality high technology products and will in all likelihood continue to be the European leader in the fields of science and technology for the next several decades. Furthermore, it currently exports between 40-60 percent of its products and in 1987 replaced the United States as the world's leading exporting nation.⁶⁸ While the country has consciously diversified its trade and its trade partners, trade with East bloc countries has slowly increased and is projected to do so throughout the remainder of the century. Increased trade relations between Germany and the East bloc are virtually a certainty as the exportation of West European manufactured goods to the East bloc is in the interest of both Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus any attempts by the United States to limit trade with the Soviets (like the pipeline or grain embargoes) will likely be met by German resistance as Eastern Europe has become a prime market place.

Too often U.S. leaders forget that both Germany and the Soviet Union are European nations. Sharing the continent they are naturally inclined to work together commercially, culturally, politically, and economically. Polarization may run contrary to their long-term interests by virtue of their location. The United States, however, situated in an entirely different hemisphere, can and often does approach the East-West issue from a different, if not detached, perspective.

A Renewal of German Insecurities. Even as the Germans do not sense an immediate threat from the Soviets, the insecurities of the past linger. They do not want to be the staging ground or battleground for the next war but neither do they want to be undefended. From their perspective the United States is slowly "decoupling" from Europe. Indicators of this policy

first came through superpower negotiations at Reykjavik and fears have been further strengthened by subsequent arms control talks and congressional discussions on the possible withdrawal of troops. The Germans are increasingly sure that they do not want their country to be the focal point for superpower confrontation but they are concerned enough with their defense that they do not want the United States to decouple from Europe and NATO. Because of these fears and insecurities, Germany has been exploring new defense relationships with France and a strengthened WEU.

Europeans Leading/Defending Europe. Given their uncertainties about the reliability of their U.S. ally, the Germans and other Europeans are looking for new defense relationships. This may be part of a general trend for Europe to reassert herself in a position of some type of political and military leadership. In the wake of World War II, Europe had no choice but to turn to the United States. Devastated by 6 years of war and Nazi domination, Germany and the remainder of Europe leaned heavily on the United States for leadership in world politics and defense. The United States willingly provided both. In the two long decades when the cold war was at its height (1948-68) the United States willingly provided the leadership and resources to block aggressive Soviet actions. But increasingly since the early 1970s, more distinctive European attitudes have emerged and Europe wants to regain the initiative in leading its own affairs.

Leadership for Europe in the defense arena, however, has come from NATO and NATO has been and is led (or dominated, depending on your perspective) by the United States. Germany and Europe in general have been willing (and sometimes eager) for American help and resources. But even while they are concerned about the "decoupling" of the United States from Europe, there appears to be a growing realization that (1) the United States may ultimately withdraw some forces or defense emphasis from Europe; (2) that perspectives on European defense are developing differently in Bonn and Washington; (3) that recent negotiations are slowly but surely removing portions of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from Europe leaving her insecure, due to the numerical superiority of the Soviet armed forces; and (4) if Europe is to be defended in the future, only the Europeans themselves can establish and maintain the appropriate defense structure.

Consequently, the last year has seen a number of initiatives, mostly emanating from France and Germany, toward independent European defense planning. These initiatives have ranged from joint French-German military exercises in September 1987, to the current plans to revive and strengthen the West European Union. Through the WEU the seven European nations, including France and Germany, intend to develop a stronger European identity on defense issues, rather than leaving European defense priorities to be established by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Growing Resentment Concerning the Nazi Legacy. In the postwar years a strong parliamentary democracy has developed in the FRG permitting Germany to regain her position in the world community of nations. Despite rejoining the world community and the establishment of an exemplary record as a parliamentary democracy, Germany still is treated with some suspicion by many countries/political leaders, due to her past militaristic record and

the 13 years of National Socialism. This distrust remains despite the fact that Germany is increasingly populated and controlled by die Enkel, the grandchildren of the generation that brought about National Socialism and World War II.⁶⁹ While the Germans continue to accept their status as a mistrusted nation, the question remains how long they will do penance to the world community for the National Socialist years and provide exemplary justification for their political or military initiatives to the world community? Given German demographics, probably not too much longer.

Section X. Potential Impacts on the United States.

How much the changing political environment in Germany will affect U.S. defense efforts may depend on how the United States reacts to change or how willing it is to develop new political strategies in an evolving political climate. What is perhaps most important is to realize that change, though gradual, is occurring in the FRG. As it gradually occurs, the United States must adjust its policies to maintain a close allied perspective with Europe. Currently there are potential problems developing between the United States and Germany regarding defense and East-West relations, but no major breakdowns have occurred.

To underscore the potential impact which changes, or more specifically, a failure to plan for changes can have on U.S. relations with Germany, three possible scenarios have been developed to look at Germany in 25 years (2013). Scenario #1 considers the slow evolution of German politics; Scenario #2 examines a Germany left of center; and Scenario #3 discusses a strong and independent Germany. In taking this approach, there is no intent by the writer to predict the future but rather to cause the reader to ponder three different Germanies and how they could affect U.S. military posture.

Scenario #1: Slow Evolution of German Politics. By the year 2013 the German political scene has achieved a considerable amount of stability and the political spectrum shows (at least outwardly) some similarities to the political scene in 1965-75. The major parties on the national level are still the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. The Greens Party, the anathema of established political parties in the 1980s, has faded to insignificance on the national level. Its decline was precipitated by stronger legislation by the German Government to protect Germany's environment and the success of continued superpower arms control negotiations which have taken U.S. missiles, ground and air launched theater nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons out of the Federal Republic. These factors plus the aging population and declining birthrate have produced a more conservative constituency in Germany.⁷⁰ Thus, the Greens, though they still exist, have fallen below the 5 percent level of the popular vote and are therefore relegated to the status of a minor state and local party.

The same political trends which neutered the Greens' threat have also impacted on the SPD by the year 2013. This began in the early 1990s when the SPD was forced to reevaluate its position, much as it did at the Bad Godesberg Congress in 1959. The SPD had repeatedly failed to win a national election, and since superpower negotiations of the late 1980s had diffused

most of the defense and foreign policy issues that brought the SPD's left to power, the party's position became untenable by the early 1990s. Consequently, a new group of pragmatists took control, reiterating that a Socialist party can build a mass party, win elections and improve the quality of life for the masses. This resulted in some of the more doctrinaire members of the Party's leadership and membership defecting and joining the Greens faction, slightly bolstering that party's sagging membership. But through this reorganization, a party configuration reminiscent of the 1960s-70s emerged.

The defense weariness which plagued Germany in the 1980s has been largely defused through arms control negotiations which removed U.S. missiles and chemical weapons, both major irritants, from the Federal Republic. Even more significant, the aging and more conservative German public recognized there was still a sizeable threat on their eastern border in the form of a large conventional Soviet military presence. Gorbachev, the liberalizing force of the 1980s, had been only partially successful with his initiatives. Like Khrushchev before him he underestimated the strength of the party conservatives and the military. While he was able to improve the political and economic climate between East and West, he was unsuccessful in significantly changing the character of the Soviet system or reducing the traditionally large Soviet Army. Thus, relations between the East and West are improved but large military forces were retained. Europe remains divided as does Germany and Berlin but the division is not as definite as it was in 1980.

In the world of the 21st century the two major German political parties are firmly committed to a strong European defense and the European defensive system is based on the NATO Alliance. Even though Germany, like six of her neighbors, retains membership in the Western European Union and values the ability of this organization to provide an arena for the discussion of European defense issues, experiences such as the WEU attempt to develop coordinated action in the 1987 Gulf Crisis proved that it does not serve as a strongly coordinated alliance like NATO.⁷¹

Perhaps one reason for increasing German confidence in NATO (and the United States) is the continued strong commitment of the United States to the defense of Europe. Despite distractions and commitments in Latin America and the Pacific Rim, U.S. political and military leaders still believe that the defense of the United States begins in Europe. Germany watched anxiously in the period 1980-81, 1986-88 and again in the early 1990s as congressional leaders attempted to reduce U.S. troop strengths in Europe. These initiatives failed, however, when the Soviets failed to reduce conventional troop strengths in Eastern Europe, as had been hinted in 1987-88. Following this attempt, the United States retained and bolstered strong military forces in Germany. The strong stand by the United States counteracted traditional German insecurities and tied Germany and the United States more closely together. Support for strong U.S. forces in Germany was further enhanced in the mid-1990s by increased German defense appropriations and German agreements to purchase additional U.S. weapons systems.⁷² These actions combined with the moderate attitudes taken by the two major parties have convinced the United States that Germany is a strong defense partner. Thus the year 2013 finds most of the traditional U.S. Army and Air Force units retained in Germany.

This strengthening of attitudes for a strong defense does not mean that the Germans have turned their backs on the detente of the 1970s and 1980s. They still value improved relations with East Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Detente from a political perspective, however, has simply failed to deliver what many politicians of the 1970s and 1980s had sought. Conversely, as the German economy continued to grow at a slow measured pace, so had its trade with the Soviet bloc. By the 21st century over 10 percent of Germany's trade was with Warsaw Pact nations, the majority with either the Soviet Union or East Germany. The Federal Republic continued the trend, established in the late 1970s, of selling industrial goods, biochemicals and high quality, high tech equipment to the Warsaw Pact nations in return for petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. For some within the NATO Alliance this increasing interrelationship of the German/Soviet bloc economies caused concern, but the Germans were pleased with the better cultural and diplomatic relations which followed the increased trade. For them better relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were still highly desirable.

The Germans came to feel that they had few alternatives but to retain a potent military force, strong relations with the United States and close affiliation with NATO, but at the same time, they continued to promote better relations between East and West and attempted to improve relations with their sister state to the east. They also worked to reduce tensions between East and West but with mixed results. The goal of German reunification has continued to elude the German leadership in the 25 years preceding 2013 and "the German problem"⁷³ of the 1970s and 1980s still remains with only miniscule steps having been taken for its resolution.

In summary, in this scenario the FRG is pro-Western, pro-NATO and pro-American. It is a prosperous state firmly rooted in Western European parliamentary democratic tradition and it exists in a Europe which is slightly less polarized between the superpowers. It values more contacts with the East and still desires German unification but not at the expense of a weak Germany or a Germany under Soviet domination. This view of the FRG should be nonthreatening to the majority of U.S. political and military leaders because it is based on the continuance (or resurgence) of some of the positive trends observed in Germany over the last 40 years. It does not factor in any catastrophic military-political-economic events, but is based on a gradual evolution of past or present events.

Scenario #2: Germany Left of Center. By the year 2013 the German political scene has achieved a considerable amount of stability but the political spectrum is radically different from the pro-Western pro-NATO Germany of 1987. In the time that elapsed from 1987 to the turn of the century a number of significant changes occurred in West Germany. Since a preponderance of the Germans in the late 20th/early 21st century preferred a less polarized Europe and less emphasis on defense matters, the last part of the 20th century found the SPD (still dominated by doctrinaire leftists) and the Greens becoming the major force in domestic German politics. Germany, under SPD leadership, clearly desired more authority in foreign affairs and military issues than was possible under the self-imposed constraints

required through membership in a voluntary alliance (NATO). Thus, when the Soviets moved to support closer relations between the Germanies and attached German withdrawal from NATO as the price tag, the German Government agreed. For many within Germany the decision was not that difficult. Repeatedly in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s significant troop withdrawals from Europe had been discussed in the United States, causing the Germans to question the reliability of U.S. commitments. This, the arms negotiations of the 1980s, and the tendency for the superpowers to negotiate and tell their allies later, convinced the Germans that they could not depend on the United States for their security.⁷⁴ When offered a less polarized/less militarized Europe and a step toward a unified Germany, the SPD Government took the chance. Due to the popularity of the SPD's policies, the conservative CDU/CSU was threatened with the prospect of becoming a minority party. Clinging closely to its conservative beliefs, the party was winning only state and local elections by the start of the 21st century.

This drastic change in German politics was possible because defense weariness had continued to grow among the German population. Even though many within the United States and in U.S. military circles continued to believe in the distinct possibility of a war in Europe, the vast majority of the German population did not, nor did they want Germany to be the site or staging ground for the next war. Consequently, antimilitary sentiment continued to develop in the population in general and was reflected in the success at the polls for the SPD and the Greens.

The United States chose to "ride out the storm" rather than initiate any major changes in policies. U.S. forces retained a very high profile in central and southern Germany. U.S. commanders at the highest level in Europe regarded themselves on the front line of a potential war zone and vigorously built and trained, often with little regard for German sensitivities and the German reverence for the environment. In keeping with patterns established in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the United States negotiated with the Soviets over issues that concerned European defense but consultation with the Germans (regarding Soviet proposals/U.S. counterproposals) was at best spotty. This, together with the continual U.S. dominance of the NATO command structure, became a source of bitterness and irritation in German political circles in the mid-1990s.

Recognizing the unpopularity of high profile military and defense spending issues in the FRG, the Soviet leadership moved to capitalize on these attitudes. Firmly under the control of the Gorbachev faction, the Soviets began a series of initiatives designed to pry the West Germans away from NATO and the United States. Though not exactly duplicating the Stalin reunification offer of 1952, the Soviets announced, in a series of carefully and cleverly worded initiatives, their support for much closer relationships between the two Germanies. Concurrent with these announcements, the Soviets pressured the East Germans to pursue a number of initiatives with their western neighbors which, although they did not equate to reunification, caused the growing belief in Gorbachev's positive intentions to skyrocket in Germany in the early 1990s. As a result of the Soviet initiatives, by the turn of the century Germany (East and West) has a Customs Union (Zollverein)⁷⁵ not unlike the one established by the Prussians with the

German states in 1834. Commercial contacts between Germany and the Soviet bloc had increased steadily between 1970-90 and through this action commercial contact between East and West accelerated rapidly. Close ties were facilitated by the establishment of a common currency for the two Germanies and by the end of the century only nominal borders with checkpoints were in existence between the two Germanies and the two Berlins. Reunification had not occurred by the early 21st century but it seemed only a matter of time.

This radically improved East-West climate has had a definite impact on both German domestic politics and relations with the United States. The effect on U.S. military posture in the West was staggering. For example, in 1990 the United States had approximately 330 thousand soldiers in Europe. With the development of the new nonaligned Germany of the 21st century the United States had to evacuate all military forces and their dependents from Germany and abandon all posts and bases. With this sudden dislocation of manpower and equipment, U.S. military forces lost 50-75 thousand soldiers from the force structure. In addition, some \$15-20 billion were required to relocate these personnel. No facilities in the continental United States could absorb the glut of men and equipment. The only thing which saved additional losses from the force structure was the Army's ability to "plug" some of the men and equipment from Europe into the light divisions (expanding them into heavy divisions). The Army and Air Force also were able to station some of their dislocated assets on bases and posts which the military had been trying to close for years (since they were no longer needed) but had been prevented from doing so, due to congressional politics.

Through changes in German politics and the existence of an astute Soviet leadership, the United States was effectively removed from its significant defensive role in Europe. In Central Europe a band of neutral states, without affiliation to either the East or West bloc, appeared to be developing. In the wake of these changes in Germany, the NATO Alliance, which brought 50 years of peace to Western and Central Europe, rapidly withered. France remained the sole independent military power in Western Europe that valued strong military preparedness and watched the Soviet Union of 2013 with great suspicion. But despite concerns about the Soviets, France would not allow American troops on French soil. France still valued its independence too much, both politically and militarily, to allow superpower interference in its affairs.

Germany in the year 2013, according to this scenario, is neutralist and "left" leaning. While it is not hostile to the United States, relations between the two former allies are strained as a result of the expulsion of American forces, the death of NATO, and the closer relationship between the Soviets and the Germans. In some respects this scenario is most important to ponder because it shows how a deterioration of the German political scene could radically affect not only the European political and defense situation but the U.S. military posture worldwide.

Scenario #3: A Strong and Independent Germany. The year 2013 found Germany a prosperous and stable nation and one of the political leaders of a strong Europe. This occurred due to a number of factors that affected the German nation between 1987 and 2013. Perhaps the most significant was the continued development of a strong parliamentary democracy in Germany. The

CDU/CSU, a leader in the political process since the first postwar government, continued as one of the two major political parties. It remained slightly right of center in the political process, valued a strong defense, promoted close cooperation with Germany's allies in Europe, and retained considerable interest in U.S. defense posture. It remained strong in 2013 due to a tradition of good leadership and Germany's aging population, which has numerically reinforced this conservative party.

The SPD, which had repeatedly attempted to build a nationally powerful party solidly based on Socialist dogma, in the 1990s returned to a more pragmatic approach to politics. After disastrous results at the polls in the 1980s a successor group to the Seeheimer Kreis⁷⁶ began to once again dominate the SPD. These realistic politicians pressed for programs which would favorably affect the masses but believed that this could only be done by a strong Germany within a less polarized Europe. Thus the SPD, in coalition with the FDP (polling between 7-9 percent of the vote by the turn of the century), led a number of initiatives in the late 1990s to build a stronger Germany and a stronger Europe. From 1949-2013, Germany never caused the world to wonder if it was reverting to its former autocratic traditions. Crises, external and internal, were ably handled by the political leadership without resorting to decrees or emergency legislation which would weaken the base of the democratic state.

Defense weariness, which had caused problems for Germany in the 1980s, was no longer a major issue in 2013. This was partly due to a reduction of tensions and military forces in Europe, but even more, because the Germans were leaders in the defense of Europe.

The process had actually begun in the late 1980s when a German was appointed as NATO Secretary-General. This appointment received substantial criticism from countries like Poland, France, and the Soviet Union which had suffered considerably under German domination during the early and mid-20th century. Criticism of appointing Germans to high ranking military positions increased with the appointment of a German as supreme military commander of NATO in the mid-1990s. The Germans, however, were in no mood to withdraw from these positions of leadership. By 1995 the Second World War (and the Nazi regime) had been over for 50 years. Germany's political (and military) leadership determined that in spite of the nation's errors, it did not intend to live with the legacy of the "original sin" of National Socialism forever. Actively participating in the leadership of European politics even further strengthened important factions in the SPD, to include Schmidt's old Seeheimer Kreis of Atlanticists and those slightly left of center who had mainly criticized German policies (in the 1970s and 1980s) and NATO for being too much under U.S. dominance.

Ties between Germans and Eastern Europe had continued to grow throughout the late 20th century but the driving force was well planned German policies rather than popular responses to Soviet initiatives. By the beginning of the 21st century, seven percent of Germany's exports and nine percent of its imports were with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Germany continued to send high quality manufactured goods and steel and chemical products to the East bloc in exchange for raw materials. Though trade grew between Germany

and Eastern Europe, and with it improved relations, the Germans were careful not to become dependent on Eastern European raw materials.

Resistance to an increasing German (and European) leadership role in Europe's defense and better relations with the East bloc was at first heavy and bitter, particularly from the United States. As Europe began leading NATO (politically and militarily) throughout the 1990s, U.S. politicians again resurrected the old cry to bring the troops home, interspersed with frequent tongue lashings of Europeans about their ingratitude for American efforts of the previous 70 years. Despite this initial bitterness, a series of NATO meetings and summits between allied leaders were held in the late 1990s. Germany, Britain and France presented clearly their desire for a continued U.S. role in the defense of Europe. Their desire, however, was for a strong partnership with all NATO nations sharing the military burden and the policy and military leadership. France at first was hesitant to affiliate her military forces with NATO but since NATO was more under European control, France increasingly participated, and by 2013 had become a strong partner, giving NATO additional nuclear capability.

By the early 21st century NATO gave the Germans (and other Europeans) a higher profile in its military and political affairs. By so doing, the Germans had a much a stronger role in their own defense. Thus Germany became a true defense partner, and was given a full and active role in the defense of Europe rather than simply being requested to increase defense appropriations or the size of its army.

In frank and open discussions between U.S and German leaders, occurring in the early 21st century, it was acknowledged that the German Army would become smaller due to the declining birth rate and that it was unlikely that the United States could continue to maintain such a large army in Europe. As a direct result of these talks, both the United States and Germany decided to scale down their contributions to NATO and develop smaller, mobile, and more lethal forces. As a result, by the early 21st century the U.S. Army in Germany consisted of six mobile high-tech brigades, stationed to provide optimum support to U.S. commitments to NATO. The German Army was reduced to slightly under 400 thousand but was equally mobile and lethal. Comparable reductions were taken by the other NATO forces although the French decreases were considerably less than other NATO powers.

This reduction in force by NATO countries was possible due to an acknowledged decreased threat of a war in Europe. The primary reason for this were the continued changes within the Soviet Union and in German-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev began a series of initiatives to improve East-West relations in the mid-1980s. The intent from the outset was to defuse East-West confrontation and permit the Soviets to expend more energies on internal priorities rather than military hardware. From the onset West Germany was receptive. The early 1990s saw a profusion of commercial and cultural agreements signed between the FRG and the Soviet Union and trade increased accordingly. Furthermore, the arms control negotiations of the 1980s (which had centered on nuclear and missile reductions) were broadened in the 1990s to include conventional arms. The successes produced by these talks made Europeans less polarized and tensions decreased considerably throughout the decade. Due to these reductions both the United States and Germany felt comfortable in scaling down their forces.

This lessening of tensions had not resulted in German reunification, but the two Germanies were slowly moving in that direction.⁷⁷ By 2013 the borders between the two Germanies were open and high level missions existed in both Bonn and Berlin, not as foreign diplomatic missions but rather as coordinative offices to promote better relations between the two Germanies. Meetings between the heads of the two states or ministers of various cabinet level positions were regularly being scheduled. East and West Germany will likely be reunited sometime in the future but this event will come as a slow evolutionary process. In this less polarized Europe, no major objections to reunification are apparent.

In summary, this scenario shows a less polarized and militarized Europe and a Soviet Union which is more concerned with its internal affairs than any type of military or political adventurism in Europe. Germany is pro-Western and pro-NATO and feels itself to be a strong leader in European affairs.

Section XI. Conclusions.

After reviewing Germany's past, present, and possible future, several conclusions seem obvious. First and foremost, it seems highly likely that Germany will experience major changes relative to defense posture and U.S./German relations within the next 25 years. For 40 years Germany has served as the staging ground for a major war and has tolerated an extremely heavy military presence. Part of this has been due to the belief, both popular and governmental, in the Soviet threat, but also has been part of the legacy of a defeated nation which bore heavily the war guilt of National Socialism.

Contemporary Germany is no longer convinced of the imminence of a Soviet threat. Part of this belief is fueled by the Gorbachev initiatives, but it goes far deeper. It results from the overall national weariness of defense or, more accurately, weariness of being a planned battleground for World War III. It also results from the absence of any major Soviet aggressions in Europe since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Without a major obvious threat to their security, the likelihood of the Germans continuing to support a strong foreign military force on their soil is decreasing.

Adding to these factors, Germany is rapidly graying. The generation that experienced National Socialism, World War II, and the massive U.S. aid which rebuilt postwar Germany is disappearing. In its place, a new generation that does not associate the United States with the Marshall Plan or the Berlin Airlift but remembers more clearly Vietnam and Watergate is emerging in positions of authority.

The newer generation is not anti-American nor pro-Soviet, but it is not inclined to accept U.S. assessments of the Soviet Union or accept U.S. defense priorities without question. It is also removed from the National Socialist era and does not feel obliged to shoulder the burden of war guilt borne by its predecessors. Conversely, this newer generation does not

possess a strong sense of patriotism and is more interested in an economically strong Germany which provides a better quality life for its citizenry, rather than engaging in any type of power politics.

To further complicate matters, German politicians on the right and left increasingly oppose U.S. policies. The left is opposed to U.S. policies due to a desire for a less polarized Europe, less defense spending, and a nuclear and chemical weapons free Germany. The right, though also desiring better East-West relations, is uneasy about the growing feeling that the U.S. commitment to Europe and Germany's defense is slowly eroding.⁷⁸ This convergence of concerns about U.S. policies by both the right and left of the German political spectrum has resulted in the current German explorations into alternative defense relationships.

These concerns and the resultant uneasiness about the United States highlight the problem of understanding contemporary Germany. The traditional insecurity remains, with the two major parties viewing the defense issues differently but both possessing uneasiness about the United States. The question remains, what does this mean for the United States and Germany in the future?

In the years ahead it is likely that Germany, France, and Britain will continue to explore some defense possibilities outside NATO, with the Germans and French taking the lead. These explorations could conceivably result in a more active WEU or a more Europeanized NATO. In part, this process is resulting from past and present frustrations with American policies or uncertainties over a perceived decline in the U.S. commitment to Europe. On a larger scale, this process could also be one part of a return to a multipolar world, comparable to that which existed before World War II. Perhaps the bipolar world was largely a result of the nuclear monopoly which, with more emphasis on conventional forces and an increasing number of nuclear capable countries, is beginning to fade. In any case, what appears to be developing is a more independent Germany, in contrast to an anti-NATO or anti-U.S. Germany.

During the next few decades, the United States and the other NATO nations will need to recognize the changing attitudes in Germany and develop new policies to respect German sensitivities. That nation remains a strong ally in the defense of Europe but one that is changing its perspectives. Perhaps key to understanding this confusing issue is realizing the likelihood that over the next 25 years Europe will become less polarized, which appears to be in the long-term interest of the Germans. As stated previously, Russians, Poles, Germans, and French are all Europeans who share a continent and have common interests. Long-term polarization of Europe into East and West blocs is probably not in their best interests. Trade, if nothing else, seems to be pulling East and West closer together. As Germany continues to be a manufacturer of high quality goods, technological items, and pharmaceuticals, the Germans will continue to seek one of their prime natural markets, Eastern Europe. The only thing which could interrupt this trend is a blatant act of aggression by the Soviets somewhere in Europe. At this time such a move seems unlikely.

It also seems in the best interests of both the United States and the FRG to encourage the latter to shoulder more of the burden for its defense. For 50 years Western Europe has depended primarily on the might of the U.S. Army to defend it. The United States has done this because it seemed the only power strong enough to withstand the Soviet colossus and because no one wanted to trust the Germans with a strong independent military force. It is time for the Europeans to take a larger and more active role in their own defense. This does not indicate the need for a massive pullout of U.S. assets, but rather a slow phasing down of the preeminent role of the United States in Western Europe. Such talk makes many Germans nervous because they are security-conscious--and have been for over 100 years. But it is time to consider a smaller U.S. role and a larger German-British-French role with appropriate U.S. guarantees.

Perhaps most important, the U.S. political and military leadership must recognize Germany as a changing and maturing nation and plan accordingly. To a degree, all of the German political parties are showing marked independence from U.S. positions, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or defense posture. Germany remains a close ally but one that seeks more independence and less emphasis on a firm divide between East and West Europe. If the United States can devise policies which, in the future, recognize the changing nature of Germany, it will have a stronger and more independent ally. Conversely, if the United States ignores the changes in Germany and attempts to continue with "business as usual," the strong relationship of the past 40 years could be in jeopardy.

ENDNOTES

1. Troop reduction has been a cyclical issue. In the summer of 1987, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, predicted U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe would be underway within 10 years, causing considerable anxiety among the European allies. See "Can Europe Stand on its Own Feet," Newsweek, December 7, 1987, p. 31.
2. The WEU is a seven member group including Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. See Dan Beyers, "Europeans Search for New Defense Relationship," Defense News, July 20, 1987, p. 1.
3. "Schizophrenia in the Ranks: The Opposition Moves Left," Time, September 8, 1986, p. 45.
4. Robert J. McCartney, "NATO Critic Likely to Lead Bonn Democrats," Washington Post, February 6, 1987, p. A-14.
5. Michael Sturmer, "The Defense of Europe: Need for a Pax Atlantica," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, July 23, 1986, p. 1. Since concerns were voiced in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1986, the SPD has continued its party sponsored initiative to meet with party leadership in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and develop agreements outside the governmental arena. This effort has resulted in the adoption of a joint paper of understandings entitled "Der Streit der Ideologien und die Gemeinsame Sicherheit." See official SPD Press release number 715/87, September 1, 1987.
6. Robert J. McCartney, "W. Germany Rejects More Libya Sanctions" Washington Post, September 4, 1986, p. A-4.
7. Originally the Germans declined stating that their commitment was to NATO and that the alliance is regional in nature. They have also mentioned that their constitution bars the dispatch of warships outside NATO regions. On October 8, 1987 it was announced that Bonn would send the destroyer Moelders, Frigate Niedersachsen and support ship Freiburg to the Mediterranean to relieve the alliance partners who were protecting shipping in the Gulf. Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) release, Hamburg, October 8, 1987. Even though ships were sent by Germany and Britain and France, they have maintained their independence from U.S. vessels. Edward Cody, "London, Paris, Bonn Back U.S. Response, Europeans Keep Ships Separate," Washington Post, October 20, 1987, p. A-26.
8. Michael H. Haltzel, "America's Troubled Relations with NATO: Root of Trouble Lies with Reykjavik," San Francisco Chronicle, February 11, 1987, p. 3.
9. Elizabeth Pond, "Pursuing the Ideal of a Central Europe," Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1987, p. 16.

10. In 1918 allied armies did not carry the war into the heartland of Germany before the war ended. Among disgruntled nationalists the myth arose that the German Army was never defeated on the field of battle but was "stabbed in the back" by Republicans, Socialists and Communists. In 1945, however, there was no doubt about Germany's defeat and thus, no fresh fuel to fire the enthusiasm of defeated nationalistic elements.

11. Martin K. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War, New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. xviii.

12. Robert G. Livingston, "A Wounded Nation," The National Interest, Winter 1987/8, p. 91.

13. Harold Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen have postulated that this lack of a German national identity has caused the Germans to transfer many of their national feelings, both pro and con to the United States. See Harold Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany," International Security, Summer 1987, pp. 72-84. See also Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Kocher in their book Der Verletzte Nation: Über den Versuch der Deutschen ihren Character zu Ändern, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1987. Note that the attempts of the Germans, urged by the allies to change their nationalistic/militaristic character, may have gone too far, resulting in the current lack of patriotism.

14. Churchill was committed to providing a larger and more secure home for the Poles. Though he was more than willing to give them East Prussia, the homeland of Prussian militarism, he was uneasy about giving them Pomerania and Silesia as well. See Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954, Vol IV, pp. 316-320.

15. The Oder-Neisse river system forms the boundary, agreed to by the Allies, for the eastern border for the Soviet Zone of Occupation. All other German land east of that line was placed either under Polish or Russian administration. This land, including Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia, has since been incorporated into Russia and Poland.

16. In 1952 Stalin offered the possibility of a unified Germany if it could be a neutral country, but Chancellor Konrad Adenauer refused this offer stating that such a plan would result in the Sovietization of Germany.

17. "The Germanies: As Sparks Fly Upward," The Economist, June 6, 1987, p. 48.

18. According to recent statistics, ethnic and family ties still exist between the Germans and the people of Eastern Europe. Herbert Hupka, a CDU politician who is interested in East European minorities, estimates that some 3.5 million Germans still live in Eastern Europe. About 2 million live in Poland, 270,000 in Romania and 220,000 in Hungary. An additional 2 million live in the Soviet Union. Noted in a January 3, 1986, DPA report from Hamburg, Germany.

19. The faction that desired a more enlightened policy toward the Slavs included widely diverse elements. See Jürgen Thorwald, The Illusion, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, or Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, London: The Macmillan Company, 1954.

20. Granted, as it collapsed, it was replaced by the Triple Entente which pitted the Russians against Germany. Despite the alliance, Wilhelm II continued to stay in contact with his cousin "Nicky" (Nicholas II, Czar of Russia) and repeatedly tried to woo Russia away from the Entente.

21. Germany was shaken by a number of revolts in late 1918-19. In Berlin the "Spartacists," led by a Marxian Socialist group, briefly held power. Bavaria also had its socialist revolution as did a number of other cities and states. Many returning German soldiers could never forget the indignities of being harassed by workers councils, organized by Socialist groups.

22. When Soviet troops overran East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and the future Ostzone, their behavior was atrocious by any standards. When Soviet troops occupied their first German Village (Nemmersdorf) on October 22, 1944, they apparently raped and mutilated all females in the village. French POWs and Polish workers were likewise mutilated and killed. See Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War, pp 117-121.

23. Dan Beyers, "Europeans Search for New Defense Relationships," Defense News, July 20, 1987, p. 1.

24. Decoupling has become an extremely popular term when referring to the United States deemphasizing its European commitments. It has been particularly used by CDU/CSU politicians who are concerned about the United States lessening its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. For a background on this issue see Henry Kissinger, "Alliance Cure: Redeployment," Washington Post, May 13, 1986, p. A-19.

25. Helmut Schmidt, The Grand Strategy for the West, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 62-63.

26. James M. Markham, "Helmut Schmidt's Valedictory: As Biting as Ever," New York Times, September 11, 1986, p. 2. More recently Schmidt described his dealings with U.S. foreign policy as it changed with the President as "alternating hot and cold showers." Jean Ascher, "Ex-West German Chief Raps Carter," Patriot News, December 13, 1987, p. A-15.

27. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War, p. xviii.

28. Ibid., p. 110.

29. In the Thirty Years War, Germany was the major battleground. For 30 years the armies of Sweden, the Hapsburgs, France and Holland battered each other on German soil, burned towns and lived off the land. In many respects it was a precursor to 1944-45.

30. The Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle of recovery occurred in war devastated Germany after 1950. In a seven year period national income rose 112 percent and wages and salaries (excluding taxes) by 119 percent. See Gordon Craig, The Germans, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, pp. 43-44.

31. Beginning with the 19th century the SPD had honed its political skills with a tradition of opposition, first to the Imperial Government, the Weimar Government, and briefly to Hitler's regime. In particular Kurt Schumacher and Ernst Reuter stood out due to their leadership skills developed in the 1920s and 30s. See Gordon Craig, The Germans, pp. 36-41.

32. Andrei Markovits, "The SPD's Strategies and Political Directions in Light of the January 1987, Bundestag Elections in the FRG," a paper presented at the annual American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1986, p. 8.

33. While the writer firmly stands on this statement, Gordon Craig notes that during the 1975-78 economic slowdown there were potential problems with polarization of the population, and a low tolerance for dissidence and nonconformity. This low tolerance was accompanied by an attempt to counter dissent by legal prohibitions. See Craig, The Germans, pp. 294-295.

34. Elizabeth Pond, "West Germany's Post-Election Blues; Disarray Even Among Winners," Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1987, p. 9.

35. In a sense this is a return to some of the pre-1959 positions. Prior to Bad Godesberg the SPD had opposed Adenauer's emphasis on German rearmament, integration into the NATO structure and his strong identification with the west bloc. Instead it wanted a less polarized if not neutral Germany (that was also unified) and an emphasis on rebuilding the shattered country's economy rather than its military.

36. Stephen F. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense After the 1987 Elections," SAIS Review, Summer/Fall 1987, pp. 56-57.

37. A prime proponent of "unique" SPD defense proposals is Andreas von Bülow, a major SPD defense strategist. At the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1985 von Bülow proposed a German Army that is structurally incapable of offense but at the same time still capable of forward defense. Furthermore, the SPD advocated a Heimatschutz, a local militia, to serve as a basis for the nation's defense force rather than a professional or standing army. See Andreas von Bülow, "Strategie Vertrauensschaffender Sicherheitsstrukturen in Europa: Wege zur Sicherheitspartnerschaft," as reported in Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense After the 1987 Elections," p. 29.

38. Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense After the 1987 Elections," pp. 56-59.

39. "Struggle for the Soul of the Greens," Insight on the News, January 11, 1988, pp. 34-35. See also "Bundes Grüne: Hoher Lernwert," Der Spiegel, June 27, 1988, pp. 26, 27.

40. Markham, "Helmuth Schmidt's Valedictory as Biting as Ever," p. 2. Despite Schmidt's biting criticism of the CDU as a puppet to U.S. interests, even CDU/CSU Chairman Alfred Dregger has called for new thinking in defending Europe. Key to his proposal is a move toward developing Western Europe into a politico-military unit using France as the basis for nuclear capability and ridding Europe of nuclear weapons with ranges under 500 kilometers. See Alfred Dregger, "Disarmament with Security: A German View," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1987/88, pp. 404-412.

41. Kohl's tactic of waiting out things or indecisiveness is extremely frustrating to many, even within the CDU--"Sitzen und Schwitzen" or "sitting and sweating it out" is simply not a tactic which builds confidence, even among colleagues in the same party. See Stephen Milligan, "Nervous Kohl is Costing his Country Dear," London Sunday Times, May 17, 1987, p. 28.

42. Wandel durch Annäherung or change through contact was the key concept of both Willy Brandt and his friend and colleague Egon Bahr. See Craig, The Germans, pp. 56-58.

43. A good summary of Ostpolitik can be found in Ronald D. Asmus, "The SPD: Second Ostpolitik with Perspectives from the USA," German Foreign Review, 1st Quarter 1987, pp. 41-43.

44. Among conservative circles there are many who have never forgiven Brandt for some of the agreements he made with the East Bloc during the early years of detente, nor the fact that Brandt fled Germany in the 1930s and fought against Germany during the war. Among the most frequently criticized acts were his normalization of the FRG's relations with the East Bloc and specifically the GDR. By so doing the existence of two German states was recognized. Secondly, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse as the permanent eastern German border was bitterly opposed by the expellees from Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia.

45. Examples most frequently mentioned by the Europeans are the Neutron Bomb issue, positions on arms control (particularly INF negotiations) and recently, and most importantly, Reykjavik.

46. Alex Vardamis, "German-American Military Fissures," Foreign Policy, Spring 1979, p. 88.

47. Ibid., pp. 89-96.

48. Helmut Schmidt, "The Zero Solution: In the German Interest," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Fall 1987, pp. 244-46.

49. The political philosophies developing within the SPD are well described in Szabo, "The German Social Democrats and Defense after the 1987 Elections," pp. 51-61 and Asmus, "The SPD's Second Ostpolitik with Perspectives from the USA," pp. 40-55.

50. Though this decision has received heavy support from the CDU/CSU, it has been bitterly criticized by many in the FDP, SPD and the Greens. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Star Wars Controversy in West Germany," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1987, p. 50.

51. Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on Reagan," Foreign Affairs, America and the World Edition, 1987/88, pp. 478-480.

52. Giovanni de Briganti, "Europeans Urged to Modernize Short Range Nuclear Weapons," Defense News, February 15, 1988, p. 12.

53. USIA Poll on West European Political Attitudes on International Security Topics (12/85) as reported in a memorandum entitled "Memorandum to Whomever is Interested," by B.G. Moeller, Chief, Host Nations Affairs, HQ USAREUR, February 27, 1986, p. 2.

54. George Gallup Jr., The Gallup Report, Princeton: The Gallup Organization, December 1986, No. 255, p. 6.

55. Fred P. Hoffman, "The U.S. As Ally Sees Us," Army, January 1988, p. 16.

56. "Deutsche Trauen Reagan Weniger als Gorbatschow," Welt am Sonntag, May 10, 1987, p. 1.

57. Ibid.

58. "Angst vor den Russen," Stern, March 16, 1987, pp. 36-38.

59. Unclassified message from American Embassy Bonn to U.S. Secretary of State, subject: Germans Trust Gorbachev, Says Opinion Poll, October 15, 1987, p. 1.

60. Michael Howard discusses in some detail the Reagan years and the issues that have caused a decline of European confidence in the United States. See Howard, A European Perspective on the Reagan Years, pp. 478-493.

61. Summary of Emnid Institute Public Opinion Survey as supplied to the writer by Benton G. Moeller, Chief, Host Nation Affairs, HQ USAREUR, p. 1.

62. Hoffman, "The U.S. As Ally Sees Us," p. 16.

63. This statement is not wishful thinking on the part of the writer. By looking at any number of reputable polls it is obvious that the Germans do not dislike U.S. citizens. For example see Flynn and Rattinger, The Public and Atlantic Defense, pp. 140-143.

64. The writer recognizes that one cannot truly compare being in a potential war zone and being in actual combat. Conversely the analogy is not inappropriate. Germany has served as a proposed battlefield for 40 years and the people are simply getting weary.

65. Of course, Germany has been the proposed battleground since the start of the cold war, but the consequences of this fact have become increasingly real through the neutron bomb, INF and GLCM controversies and through the increased emphasis on conventional forces. Furthermore, one must also consider the effect of Die Enkel and their attitudes toward war.

66. Peter Bender, "The Superpower Squeeze," Foreign Policy, Winter 1986-87, p. 99.

67. In Chancellor Kohl's State of the Nation address on March 14, 1986, he devoted most of his speech to the improvement of relations with the GDR. This has since occurred with visits by dignitaries from both states, including East German leader Erick Honecker's visit to the FRG in September 1987.

68. Thomas F. O'Boyle, "German Firms Stress Top Quality Niches to Keep Exports High," The Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1987, p. 1.

69. It is acknowledged that a number of the older generation remain in power. Chancellor Kohl, CDU Caucus Chairman Alfred Dregger and, until his recent death, Franz Joseph Strauss are all from the older postwar leadership. Politicians of that generation, however, are retiring at a steady rate. SPD leaders Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt both left politics in 1986.

70. As noted in a recent publication, West Germany's total fertility rate is now down to 1.3 children per woman, less than Europe in general which is 1.8. Considering these statistics, Europe could soon begin losing population at an alarming rate. See Ben Wattenberg and Karl Zinsmeister, eds., Are World Population Trends A Problem?, Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985, p. 2.

71. In 1987 the WEU, emerging from a period of inactivity attempted to coordinate a European response to the threat to Gulf shipping. Ultimately this proved unsuccessful but the WEU is becoming much more active. See Elizabeth Pond, "West Europeans Revive Own Defense Compact," Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 1987, p. 12.

72. In his excellent article, previously cited, Alex Vardamis discusses the tendency of European nations to prevent American arms manufacturers from entering the European market and the pressure brought to bear by the U.S. Government on Bonn to buy U.S. weapons systems. See Vardamis, "German-American Military Fissures," p. 105.

73. "The German Problem" referred to is divided Germany, East and West, and a divided Berlin. To some, until this situation is resolved, Europe will find it difficult, if not impossible, to move away from the cold war legacy of 1947-1968.

74. In addition to the events mentioned, the Germans are currently concerned due to the continued threats of troop withdrawals and the reduction of the U.S. missile/nuclear umbrella. Reykjavik is to them a constant reminder that the superpowers can negotiate their future.

75. The Zollverein was a device used by Prussia in the 1850s to build strong commercial contacts with other German states since unification was not feasible. Today, stronger commercial ties would probably precede political reunification.

76. The Seeheimer Kreis is an existent faction in the SPD today and formerly was led by Helmut Schmidt. Moderate and practical in approach it sought a strong role for Germany in defense matters and close cooperation with the other European states.

77. As the reader has undoubtedly noted, none of the scenarios forecasts German reunification. Most scholars believe that unification will come "someday" but not in the near future. For an opposing view see Marvin Cetron and Thomas O'Toole, Encounters With The Future, New York: McGraw Hill, 1982, pp. 112-113. This work predicts a removal of Russian troops from Germany in 1990 and reunification by 1995.

78. The recent release of the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy's report Discriminate Deterrence has caused conservative elements even more anxiety. It calls for a recognition of a broader range of dangers facing the United States rather than simply a massive Soviet attack against Central Europe. To some German conservatives it marks the departure of the Eurocentrism of U.S. defense strategy. See Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.

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